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Abstract Thomas Christiano claims that one of the fundamental challenges de-
mocracy is faced with is the appropriate division of epistemic labor between citi-
zens and experts. In this article I try to present and analyze Christiano’s solution 
from the perspective of social epistemology while utilizing the concepts and tools 
provided by this discipline. Despite fundamentally agreeing with his position, I at-
tempt to propose a certain addition which might enrich this solution with addi-
tional epistemic and political responsibility. In the first part, I briefly elaborate on 
the relevance of social epistemology in discussions regarding the epistemic justifi-
cation of deliberative democracy. In the second part, I contextualize Christiano’s 
view within discourses regarding social epistemology and identify his approach as 
reliability democracy due to his belief that truth-sensitive decision-making pro-
cesses are ensured through the usage of reliable mechanisms (which allow for ex-
pertise to generate the epistemically best decisions possible). In the third part I at-
tempt to provide arguments that support further elaboration of Christiano’s pro-
posals in the direction of ensuring additional epistemic and democratic quality of 
decisions.
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Thomas Christiano claims that one 
of the fundamental challenges democra-
cy is faced with is the appropriate divi-
sion of epistemic labor between citizens 
and experts. He himself offers a sugges-
tion of how the notion should be imple-
mented while taking into account the 
assumption that the epistemic justifica-
tion of democracy is just as important as 
the political or, using simpler terms, 
while accepting the thesis that democra-
cy should have the epistemic property of 
generating epistemically high-quality 
decisions or solutions to problems. In 
this article I try to present and analyze 
Christiano’s solution from the perspec-
tive of social epistemology, utilizing the 
concepts and tools provided by this dis-
cipline. Despite fundamentally agreeing 
with his position, which I will further 
refer to as reliability democracy, I at-
tempt to propose a certain addition 




























which might enrich his solution with 
additional epistemic and political re-
sponsibility.
In the first part, I briefly elaborate on 
the relevance of social epistemology in 
discussions regarding the epistemic jus-
tification of deliberative democracy. In 
the second part, I contextualize Chris-
tiano’s view within discourses regarding 
social epistemology and identify his ap-
proach as reliability democracy due to 
his belief that truth-sensitive decision- 
making processes are ensured through 
the usage of reliable mechanisms (which 
allow for expertise to generate the epis-
temically best decisions possible). In the 
third part I attempt to provide argu-
ments that support further elaboration 
of Christiano’s proposals in the direction 
of ensuring an additional epistemic and 
democratic quality of decisions.
1. Social Epistemology and the  
 epistemic justification of  
 deliberative democracy
Traditionally, epistemology focuses 
on doing research related to the process 
of forming, revisiting and retaining the 
beliefs of individuals or to the epistemic 
properties of beliefs. Social epistemolo-
gy, as a part of epistemology, deals with 
the more specific research of the process 
of creating, revisiting and retaining the 
beliefs of all epistemic agents within a 
broader social context, or, in other 
words, the epistemic qualities of beliefs 
held by individuals, groups, institutions 
and social systems (Goldman, 1987, 
1999, 2004, 2010, 2011, Prijic Samarzija, 
2005). Social epistemology is, due to the 
object of its focus, far more related to 
epistemically relevant situations in real 
life, which allows us to refer to it as ap-
plied epistemology or real world episte-
mology.
It is important to note that social 
epistemology departs from traditional 
epistemology which rarely refers to 
practical epistemic problems found in 
real life, but rather remains focused on 
evaluating the acquisition of knowledge 
in extremely idealized circumstances: 
individual epistemic agents are imagined 
as people of almost unlimited logical 
ability and seemingly with no restric-
tions regarding their cognitive resourc-
es. Moreover, standard analytic episte-
mology usually assumes that truth and 
rationality are hardly at all related to the 
issues of power and the social identities 
of participants in epistemic practices. 
The epistemic subject has been under-
stood as an asocial being and socio- 
political circumstances have been disre-
garded as irrelevant to epistemic ques-
tions. In opposition to the traits of 
traditional epistemology, the influential 
postmodernist orthodoxy developed, 
and not only pointed out the importance 
of the social in epistemic processes, but 
also defended the thesis that the epis-
temic agent is a function of power rela-
tions. It has also sought the rejection of 
universal norms of rationality, justifica-
tion and truth. Within postmodern the-
ories or social constructivism, the epis-
temic subject is reduced to her social 
and political role, her beliefs to social 
and cultural constructions and the over-
all epistemic task to the deconstruction 
of beliefs and the analysis of the so-
cio-cultural impact that caused such 
particular beliefs. This difference in un-
derstanding the relationship between 
cognition and society reflects the tension 
between modernist and postmodernist 
orthodoxy or traditionalism and reduc-
tionism: the issues of power and the so-
cial situatedness of beliefs were ignored 
by the first, while the epistemic phenom-
enon was later reduced to power rela-







































Social epistemology, which was sys-
tematically articulated for the first time 
by Alvin I. Goldman, is, by definition, 
positioned between traditionalists and 
reductionists: it accepts the legitimacy of 
researching the social dimension of be-
lief, but also retains the modernist values 
of traditional epistemology, primarily 
the view that epistemic values such as 
rationality, justification and truth can be 
considered objectively valid and not 
mere social constructions. Epistemic 
agents (individuals, groups, institutions 
and systems) establish, maintain and re-
vise their beliefs/judgments/decisions 
under the influence of society. However, 
all these beliefs/judgments/decisions are 
not mere constructions of power and 
consequently can and should be a (e)
valued as rational, reasonable, true or 
more or less suited to solve a certain 
problem.
One of the themes of social episte-
mology is researching the epistemic 
properties of democracy as a system 
with the aim of setting norms related to 
the epistemically optimal way of making 
beliefs, judgments or decisions in socie-
ty. As real world epistemology, its goal is 
to improve the system of making deci-
sions, beliefs and judgments in a manner 
that encourages those which are ration-
al, justified, reliable and truth-oriented. 
In other words, it is assumed in social 
epistemology that democracy can be 
defended as a good political system not 
only on the basis of the principle of equal 
rights, but because it has proven to be 
particularly well suited to making good 
political decisions (e.g. decisions that 
best promote the society’s interests). 
Goldman writes: “Writers who empha-
size the way that genuine democracy 
makes use of ‘situated knowledge’ to 
improve the community’s overall knowl-
edgeability make roughly this kind of 
social-epistemological contribution to 
democratic theory.” (Goldman, 2010: 25)
Thomas Christiano is certainly one 
of those authors: a political philosopher 
who, without engaging in social episte-
mology as such, has provided an impor-
tant social-epistemological contribution 
to democratic theory. In several of his 
works, but particularly in the article 
“Rational Deliberation among Experts 
and Citizens,” Christiano elaborates the 
way to make epistemically optimal de-
cisions in a deliberative democracy 
(Christiano, 2012). However, before I 
present Christiano’s position more clear-
ly I will provide a brief introduction into 
the discussion by locating his views in 
the context of the epistemic justification 
of deliberative democracy as it could 
ameliorate the clarity of the discourse.
1.1. Deliberative democracy and experts
Democracy is politically justified if 
free and equal citizens participate in the 
decision-making process in a fair man-
ner. On the other hand, democracy is 
epistemically justified if the generated 
decisions are epistemically optimal or of 
high epistemic quality, correct, true, 
truth-oriented, reliable and capable of 
effectively solving the problems citizens 
are faced with. Social epistemology is a 
natural partner of political philosophy 
in considering the epistemic properties 
democracy i.e., in researching the epis-
temic justification of deliberative de-
mocracy.
The concept of deliberative democ-
racy is relatively new in political philos-
ophy and it refers to the view that legiti-
mate legislative and other issues should 
be based on the citizens’ public discus-
sions. Thus defined, democracy is even 
at a conceptual level closely linked to the 
























justified system in order to be fully legit-
imate. Despite numerous representatives 
of the concepts of public discussions and 
the public use of reasoning in the demo-
cratic process throughout history,1 from 
the very beginning there has been the 
question whether the fact that a decision 
was reached on the basis of discussion 
and the exchange of reasons is truly 
enough to define the decision as one of 
high epistemic quality or one that is 
truth-conductive.2 Since the first debates 
1 Thomas Hobbes and John Locke point out 
that the plurality of interests is a source of 
civil conflict which highlights the need for 
the public use of reasoning (Hobbes, 1968, 
Locke, 1980).  Jean-Jacques Rousseau em-
phasized the desirability of establishing con-
sensus between citizens regarding common 
interests, assets and traditions which neces-
sarily involves some form of harmonization 
of opinions and public reasoning (civil re-
publicanism), (Rousseau, 1967). Hannah 
Arendt and John Dewey also emphasize the 
importance of public debate as an element of 
participatory democracy, autonomy and in-
dependence of citizens (Arendt, 1958, 1973, 
Dewey, 1988). Joseph Bessette defines delib-
erative democracy as the optimal framework 
for the public exchange of reasons, rational 
arguments and rational reasoning (Bassete, 
1980). Jon Elster advocates the practice of 
rational harmonization by the means of 
public debate as a necessary element of 
democratic decision-making (Elster, 1983, 
2002). And this opisnio is shared by many 
other prominent contemporary philoso-
phers such as Joshua Cohen, Jurgen Haber-
mas, Thomas Chriatiano, Gerald Gaus  and 
many others (Cohen, 1986, Habermas, 1987, 
1996, Christiano, 1996, Gaus 1996).
2 Joseph Schumpeter, an elitist, emphasized 
that citizens are politically uninformed, apa-
thetic and easily manipulated and that their 
participation thus presents a serious danger 
to stability (Schumpeter, 1942). The pessi-
mistic realist Max Weber held that there is 
no common good on which everyone could 
agree in any discussion, and argued that the 
optimal rule must include a managerial elite: 
on democracy and even more pro-
nounced after the introduction of the 
concept of deliberative democracy, there 
has been a certain awareness of the con-
flict between epistemic and political 
justification: the preservation of the val-
ues of equality, freedom, autonomy and 
even the participation of every citizen in 
the discussion and the decision-making 
does not automatically generate the epis-
temically optimal decisions. Democratic 
public discourse, at best, ensures that 
decisions are made through the rational 
agreement of participants. It is certainly 
a commendable virtue, but the question 
of whether such a political decision is at 
the same time epistemically valuable re-
mains unanswered.
democracy ought to be reduced to negative-
ly controlling the leader through the possi-
bility of their ejection in the next election 
(Weber, 1964). Anthony Downs, a repre-
sentative of the so-called economic theory 
of democracy, better known as rational 
choice theory, argued that there is no such 
common good that could be acceptable to 
all citizens/consumers, so the debate that 
would supposedly lead to a higher quality 
process of achieving rational results accept-
able to everyone would consequently not 
make much sense (Downs, 1957). Likewise, 
many contemporary authors referred to em-
pirical data that indicated that discussion it-
self does not guarantee epistemically high- 
quality beliefs as it takes place in episte-
mically sub-ideal circumstances in which 
par ticipants are uninformed, disinterested 
and lacking time and other resources neces-
sary for participating in a debate in a com-
petent manner. It is said that there is noth-
ing in these unregulated discussions that 
guarantees that the better informed will be 
able to impose their viewpoints upon others 
or that the less informed will be inclined to 
align or change their beliefs when faced with 
the attitudes of the better informed  (Gigone 
and Hastie, 1993, Carpini and Keeter, 1996, 







































This tension between the epistemic 
and political goal is, in the second step, 
focused on resolving the problem of the 
role of experts or those who are, in com-
parison with other citizens, better at 
making informed decisions or decisions 
which more effectively solve problems 
(or at least better at avoiding bad deci-
sions) (Goldman, 2011, Prijic Samarzija, 
2011). If we seek the truth or the epis-
temic quality of decisions with the aim 
of solving problems, there is the imme-
diate question of privileging the opin-
ions of experts, as opposed to our deep-
est democratic convictions of the equali-
ty of citizens. Some philosophers actual ly 
proposed certain forms of decision-mak-
ing in defense of epistocratic methods: 
the most famous proposals are certainly 
Plato’s kallipolis, Mill’s plural vote, and 
Schumpeter’s or Weber’s elitism. How-
ever, authors who criticized epistocracy 
and the privileged treatment of experts 
in democratic decision-making are far 
more numerous.
Objections to epistocracy or the 
privileged treatment of experts can be 
roughly divided into three groups. The 
first complaints argue that there are no 
experts in making political or ethical 
beliefs, judgments or decisions. Even if 
there are people who (objectively) know 
more than others about political facts, it 
does not make them experts in the sense 
that they could make decisions for or 
instead of others, among other things, 
because of the fact that in democratic 
decision-making nobody is obliged to 
accept that someone else could make a 
better decision about what is good for 
them (Rawls, 1973, Estulnd 2008, Peter 
2009). The second group of worries is 
related to the position that, even if we 
accept that there are experts in the mat-
ters of politics and ethics, they cannot 
produce epistemically better decisions 
because they are not neutral. The views 
of experts are characterized by their spe-
cial (social, class-related and other) in-
terests or perspectives which makes 
their opinions poorly suited to properly 
reflect general interests. (Kitcher, 2011). 
In continuation to the stance that not 
even experts are objective and neutral, it 
is argued that in these circumstances it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to define an 
adequate way to evaluate moral exper-
tise and to make the general acceptance 
of the moral expertise of experts possi-
ble (Christiano, 2008, Peter, 2009, 2013a). 
The third group of objections is related 
to doubts about the procedures of form-
ing beliefs or making decisions in socie-
ty, which necessarily corrupt the episte-
mic quality of decisions. In other words, 
even if we accepted that there were ob-
jective experts in politics and ethics who 
are able to abstract from their own inter-
ests and prejudices, the practices and the 
very organization of the system in which 
decisions are made are such that they 
cannot possibly make epistemically op-
timal decisions (Shapin and Schaffer, 
1985, Latour and Woolgar, 1986).
In short, the fundamental problem 
democracy is faced with is the question 
of integrating the plausible idea that 
some people know more about certain 
issues than others with the democratic 
ideals and principles of equality and 
freedom (Kitcher, 2011, Christiano 2012). 
The crucial question here is whether it 
is possible at all to resolve the tension 
between the stated epistemic and de-
mocratic virtues, or how the epistemic 
and political goals ought to be harmo-
nized.
It comes across as appropriate to 
classify the possible answers into three 
groups.
The first approach to this issue is tra-
ditionalist, or an approach that is based 
























and political values and goals. Conse-
quently, there is a stern rejection of not 
only the possibility, but the necessity of 
harmonizing the aforementioned politi-
cal and epistemic justifications of de-
mocracy. Among these political philoso-
phers there is a prevalent and widespread 
belief in the primacy of the political jus-
tifications of democracy: they link the 
advocacy of democratic discussion main-
 ly to the preservation of the values of 
equality and freedom, or to resolving 
political issues, as opposed to striving to 
improve the epistemic quality of deci-
sions (Rawls, 1973, Gaus 2009). The aim 
of deliberation is not to generate (more) 
informed or epistemically better deci-
sions, but to approach the intrinsic ideal 
of political equality. Deliberation has an 
instrumental value in resolving conflicts 
and disagreements, and it is a method 
through which disagreeing parties aim 
to resolve their dissent by the means of 
public, rational and impartial discourse 
(Gaus, 2009). Public discussion is essen-
tially not seen as an epistemic process 
that pursues epistemic values, but strict-
ly as a political process which seeks to 
achieve the desired political result; the 
exchange of reasons is only a means of 
achieving a better and faster alignment 
of stances, rather than epistemically val-
uable decisions (Manin 1987, Sustain 
1993, Michelman, 1989, Benhabib 1996, 
Fishkin, 1994).
The second approach is reductionist 
and related to the constructivist trends 
of reducing epistemic goals and values to 
ones which are political and ethical. This 
approach is best characterized by the 
position of (pure) epistemic procedural-
ism.3 As evident from its very name, 
3 David Estlund condones epistemic proce-
duralism, while Fabienne Peter represents 
pure epistemic proceduralism (Estlund, 1997, 
2008, Peter, 2009, 2012).
epistemic proceduralism stresses the im-
portance of the epistemic justification of 
democracy and argues that a fair demo-
cratic procedure itself ought to provide 
epistemically high-quality decisions. 
However, despite attempting to appear 
focused on the epistemic justification of 
democracy, this approach is essentially 
reductionist as it reduces the epistemic 
quality of decisions to conducting cor-
rect political procedures and fails to no-
tice the independent epistemic value 
separated from the democratic proce-
dure (Peter, 2009). Even when recogniz-
ing the procedure-independent epistem-
ic value of truth and the possibility that 
the final result of a democratic discus-
sion may not be of highest possible epis-
temic quality due to an imperfect proce-
dure, proceduralists defend the primacy 
of decisions made using a fair procedure 
over solutions of higher epistemic quali-
ty (Estlund, 1997, 2008).
Finally, only the third approach in-
cludes the genuine intention to integrate 
the plausible idea that some people are 
more knowledgeable than others regard-
ing certain questions with the democrat-
ic ideal and the principles of equality 
and freedom (Goldman 2010, Kitcher 
2011, T. Christano 2012). This approach 
advocates the division of epistemic labor 
between experts and citizens in the deci-
sion-making process and is the only one 
that can be considered truly hybrid in 
attempting to harmonize epistemic and 
political values. This approach can in-
clude consensualism, the position that 
the division of labor should be based on 
harmonizing all citizens’ stances in a 
way that is largely dependent on experts: 
the aim of public discussions is to 
achieve consensus formed by non-ego-
tistically adapting personal beliefs to the 
beliefs of those who know more through 
an iterated process which relies on ex-







































perts (Kitcher 2011). Another option is 
the veritistic approach, which relies on 
the view that the epistemic justification 
of democracy is ensured only if the uti-
lized democratic procedures are likely to 
fulfill their truth-seeking mission. In 
other words, the goal is to organize the 
process of a democratic discussion in 
order for it to result in beliefs/decisions 
that are correct, truth–conductive or 
even true (Goldman, 2010).
Thomas Christiano is undoubtedly 
an advocate of the third option or the 
need to harmonize epistemic and politi-
cal justification by means of an approach 
which pleads for the division of epistem-
ic labor between citizens and experts.
The purpose of democratic delibera-
tion is epistemic and practical, it is to 
uncover facts about interests and 
equality and how best to pursue 
them for the purpose of making 
good collective decisions. (...) The 
process of deliberation requires a 
division of labor (...). But the divi-
sion of labor has traditionally been a 
problem for democracy and a prob-
lem for an egalitarian society. (...) 
The question is how can we enjoy the 
advantages of the division of labor 
and politics while treating each oth-
er as equals? (Christiano, 2012: 27-
28)
Christiano, aware of the challenges 
his option is faced with, developed his 
proposed solution to the problem of har-
monizing epistemic and political justifi-
cation within the veritistic approach or 
the so-called reliability democracy (Chri-
stiano, 2008).
2. Reliability democracy
The very term ‘reliability democracy’ 
was introduced by Alvin Goldman in 
order to juxtapose it and the consensual-
ist approach: he holds that those who 
focus on consensus as the objective of 
good deliberation could not label it as 
‘epistemic’ and contrasts them with 
those who plead for reliable i.e., truth- 
conductive public deliberation. He calls 
this a ‘reliabilist approach to democracy’ 
and defines the defenders of this kind of 
rationale or justification for democracy 
as ‘reliability democrats.’ Rational public 
deliberation is not necessarily sufficient 
to yield reliable doxastic outputs but it 
might be possible to add and specify ad-
ditional constrains on the standards of 
public deliberation so that if a group 
satisfied those constrains in addition to 
the first ones, public deliberation would 
tend to increase the group’s reliability. If 
we want to epistemically defend democ-
racy because it does particularly well in 
making correct political decisions, it 
would be helpful to show (i) how specific 
features of (deliberative) democracy 
would contribute to the best decision 
and (ii) why such features are compara-
tively epistemically more valuable than 
alternative ones. Goldman himself is fo-
cused on the analysis of the Condorcet 
Jury Theorem as the paradigmatically 
reliabilist kind of contribution. Con-
dorcet Jury Theorem, however, does not 
address public deliberation and its in-
trinsic substance. In contrast, it was 
Christiano who offered to elaborate ad-
ditional procedures and mechanisms in 
truth-sensitive, public, democratic dis-
cussion.
When advocating the division of 
epistemic labor between experts and cit-
izens, Christiano is aware of the prob-
lems generated by the epistocratic ap-
proach. Moreover, he has himself pro-
vided arguments against the privileged 
treatment of experts in the deci-
sion-making process because it is im-
























the experts or the most competent indi-
viduals truly are. He highlights the dif-
ferences between technical and moral 
competencies. The idea of democracy/
equality is not a naturally plausible 
method of truth searching in science 
where the stances of the most educated 
in the area are the most important ones. 
On the other side, he notes, no distribu-
tion of social power can be based on the 
rankings of moral competence and si-
multaneously satisfy the public because 
of the controversies surrounding the 
possible ranking methods. There is no 
test (substantial or procedural) that can 
adequately assess moral competence. 
This does not mean that Christiano pre-
supposes that individuals are equally 
competent, that we ought to think of 
each other as equally competent or even 
that our competencies are incommensu-
rable. It simply allows that people will 
disagree in their assessments of other 
people’s competences. Each person has 
the right to judge that another person is 
more competent than herself and/or 
others and to think of that person as a 
kind of advisor or leader with regard to 
moral questions. The crucial point 
Christiano wants to stress is that, even if 
we assume that there is genuine exper-
tise in moral issues and politics and that 
inequalities in moral competences are 
relevant, there is no expertise that is gen-
erally acceptable in the way that we can 
simply leave the entire decision-making 
process to experts:
(...) a scheme that gives greater polit-
ical power to the well-educated must 
inevitably appear to many to give 
their interests greater weight than 
the others. This conclusion and the 
principles of equality and weak pub-
licity together imply that such a dis-
tribution of power would be unjust 
(Christiano, 2008: 121).
Therefore, he strives to define an op-
tion that would approach experts with 
seriousness, but without the mentioned 
epistocratic doubts: he claims that we 
cannot take democratic deliberation se-
riously if ordinary citizens generally ig-
nore the relevant, specialized scientific 
knowledge whilst deliberating on issues 
that clearly require such knowledge 
(Christiano, 2012). In other words, he 
calls for a division of labor that respects 
truth-sensitive, democratic decision mak-
 ing procedures. The denial of epistocra-
cy doesn’t imply denying the role of ex-
perts in the division of epistemic labor. 
Since experts can improve the epistemic 
quality of decisions, the epistemic justi-
fication of democracy need not ignore 
the experts’ contribution.
2.1. The aim of truth-sensitivity
Christiano holds that the democratic 
decision-making process needs to be 
truth-sensitive. Because truth-insensi-
tivity can be identified as one of the chief 
challenges of democratic deliberation, 
the crucial question is: how does one 
integrate specialized knowledge of the 
sciences with democratic deliberation 
when it is clearly relevant to good deci-
sion-making.
According to Christiano, priority in 
the democratic division of labor ought 
to be given to defining the role of citi-
zens. Citizens are essentially a driving 
element in society because (i) they 
choose the aims of society, (ii) they are 
the sources of different and competing 
research programs in various expert do-
mains and (iii) they are the evaluators of 
the pursuit of aims to whom the rest of 
society is accountable. Expertise is not as 
fundamental to the choice of aims as to 
the development of legislation and poli-
cy. Christiano stresses that the Downsi-







































tween citizens and politicians (experts) 
is a vastly oversimplified picture. The 
division of labor needs to take into ac-
count the process of differentiated delib-
eration between various levels of experts: 
deliberation among interest group asso-
ciations, political parties, political staff-
ers, newspapers, media, universities 
(experts in economics, sociology, law, 
political science, and the natural scienc-
es) think tanks, parts of the administra-
tion, web logs and other institutions and 
groupings that are the hallmarks of dem-
ocratic societies. These various experts 
use their particular expertise to deter-
mine how to implement the aims that 
citizens impose upon them.
Expertise plays a dual role in demo-
cratic deliberation: on one hand, there 
are highly sophisticated deliberations 
among experts concerning the best the-
ories for crafting policies; on the other 
hand, expertise acts as a kind of external 
filter for the deliberations of other parts 
of the division of labor, such as that 
among politicians and ordinary citizens. 
There are four main democratic mecha-
nisms of the deliberative process that 
ensure that (i) experts faithfully pursue 
the aims of citizens (principal agent 
problem) and that (ii) decisions are of 
the highest attainable quality (problem of 
truth-sensitivity). These four principles 
– solidarity, overlapping understanding, 
competition, sanctions – guarantee 
truth-sensitivity and simultaneously de-
fend the interests of the citizens.
Solidarity is a mechanism by which 
two persons may be motivated to sup-
port each other’s aims due the similarity 
of their backgrounds and like-minded-
ness. People are like-minded when they 
share political and moral aims and have 
some broadly common sense of how to 
achieve these aims. When citizens share 
this like-mindedness with experts they 
can trust that the experts will pursue 
these common aims despite the fact that 
their opportunities and capacities for 
understanding and monitoring the ex-
perts are relatively limited. Overlapping 
understanding refers to the state of af-
fairs in which two or more people share 
some expertise and do not share other 
expertise. This overlapping intelligibility 
enables citizens to partially appreciate 
the reasons, even if they do not fully un-
derstand the experts’ theories. Namely, 
due to the fact that there are many per-
sons who have a partial understanding, 
there are ways of monitoring the theo-
rizing and honesty of experts. Competi-
tion between experts maintains the qual-
ity of the decision-making process at the 
highest level. Each set of overlapping 
experts ensures that the members sup-
porting their own viewpoint/party and 
those supporting others genuinely act in 
accordance with the best available theo-
ries. Diversity between experts concern-
ing their different political viewpoints, 
different conceptions of aims and the 
fact that they belong to different political 
parties or factions, ensures that they will 
regard the evidence, reasoning and ar-
guments that the opposing experts do 
not take into account. Finally, the sys-
tem imposes a variety of sanctions upon 
those who fail to pursue the aims faith-
fully and competently. The system in-
volves networks of scientists who moni-
tor the efficacy of policies in bringing 
about the aims. In this context incompe-
tence, errors and unfaithfulness are be 
criticized and result in the experts losing 
their trust-worthiness, perceived com-
petence, political support and political 
and administrative positions, etc. (Chri-
stiano, 2012: 37–42).
It is crucial to notice that, despite the 
fact that Christiano recognizes the role 
of experts, he is not a representative of 
























in epistemic justification is ascribed to 
reliable democratic mechanisms which 
insure that truth-sensitive decisions are 
made through the engagement of ex-
perts:
When the mechanisms I described 
are working well, the external con-
nection between the social science 
and the policy-maker can be a relia-
ble one for producing reasonably 
good decisions (Christiano, 2012: 
44).
He is a reliability democrat par excel-
lence in Goldman’s sense because he pre-
cisely detects this “additional constraint 
on the standards of public deliberation” 
which appropriately satisfies the epis-
temic rationale of truth conduciveness.
3.  External and internal  
 epistemic justification
It ought to be stressed that, accord-
ing to Christiano, citizens and politi-
cians are not expected to completely 
understand the specific expertise or the 
experts’ theories in order to qualify the 
process of decision-making as epistemi-
cally or democratically justified. This 
means that citizens and politicians can 
choose the theory they act upon or the 
decision they accept not on the basis of 
the best evidence available to them or on 
the basis of fully understanding the un-
derlying reasoning. The crucial condi-
tion of making truth-sensitive decisions 
is a set of reliable democratic mecha-
nisms which citizens and politicians can 
rely on. In this respect the belief, judg-
ment or decision attained by the most 
reliable procedures is epistemically ex-
ternal to the citizens. Reliability democ-
racy in general and Christiano as its 
representative promote external epis-
temic justification: a decision is epistem-
ically justified if it is produced by a 
truth–sensitive mechanism even if citi-
zens and politicians are not fully aware 
of the reasons that make a decision epis-
temically justified or true. Citizens and 
politicians who favor one policy over 
another cannot entirely defend it against 
their adversaries in the policy-making 
world as their confidence is based solely 
on the fact that some community of ex-
perts claims something and that there 
are reliable mechanisms that prevent the 
miss-usage of their role as experts.
Epistemically, this problem of defer-
ence to experts consists of the objection 
that we cannot be justified/responsible 
in accepting experts’ stances if we are 
not capable of understanding them, 
grasping them or truly assessing their 
correctness: to say that a certain decision 
doesn’t seen understandable or even 
true to me and, at the same time, to ac-
cept it as true cannot be epistemically 
responsible and justified – even under 
the assumption that this is truth-con-
ductive. Furthermore, deference implies 
a requirement for blind trust and essen-
tially disconnects a citizen from the de-
cision-making process by invoking an 
undesirable element of epistocracy: the 
mere fact that democratic mechanisms 
are truth-sensitive (similarly to the fact 
that experts allegedly know better) is 
ineligible in justifying the coercion of 
citizens to obey. It seems that the exter-
nalism of reliability democracy can im-
ply epistemically unjustified deference 
or blind trust in decisions we do not 
understand and a democratically unjus-
tified claim for obeying a decision or 
solution that is not, in the relevant sense, 
ours.
3.1. Derivative vs. fundamental  
 authority of experts
Christiano’s promising proposal of 







































citizens and experts based on clearly de-
fined roles and reliable or truth-sensitive 
democratic mechanisms can be adapted 
to evade the objection of deference. It is 
true that citizens and politicians simply 
do not have enough expertise to appraise 
the content of experts’ beliefs, judge-
ment and decisions. Even scientists do 
not have enough evidence to understand 
or assess the reports of other specialists 
in their field (Foley, 1994, Hardwig, 
1991). We are all, more or less, in the 
position of a non-expert who does not 
have (or even cannot ever attain) a suffi-
cient level of expertise or experience to 
understand and evaluate all decisions 
made by all experts. However, this does 
not automatically mean (i) that our reli-
ance and trust are necessarily blind or 
even gullible (ii) that we are forcefully 
coerced into deferring our beliefs to ex-
perts or reliable mechanisms.
Our inevitable reliance on experts is 
based on an important epistemic need 
derived from epistemic dependence and 
the lack of expertise. However, we 
should require that citizens and politi-
cians have relevant epistemic access to 
decisions. They have to participate in the 
decision making procedure in an epis-
temically more active and responsible 
way: their reliance on experts and dem-
ocratic procedures needs to be based on 
understanding their own epistemically 
dependent position and, consequently, 
on the epistemically conscientious rea-
soning behind their reliance on experts 
and the democratic mechanisms that 
preserve the truth-sensitivity of deci-
sions. In other words, instead of the 
stern externalism assumed in reliability 
democracy, a certain internalist approach 
should be more epistemically and demo-
cratically justified: citizens have to rely 
on experts and truth sensitive proce-
dures on the basis of reason and evi-
dence, or on the understanding of the 
decision-making reliability. In short, what 
makes a result of deliberation epistemi-
cally and democratically justified is not 
the fact that it is based on a reliable 
mechanism in which experts have their 
role, but the fact that citizens assess or 
understand that the decision of experts 
are, for some reason, acceptable.
There are reasons to assume that 
Christiano shares a similar view:
The policy-maker’s decision is not 
completely unjustified because they 
have reason to think that the theory 
on which they are operating is well 
thought of in the expert community. 
The endorsement of a number of 
experts gives them confidence that 
the theory is a good one though they 
do not see the reasons directly. (…) 
The policy-makers act on the basis of 
information shortcuts when they take 
the assent of experts as defining the 
boundaries of acceptable science. (...) 
But that reliability, I contend, cannot 
be established without the phenom-
ena of solidarity, overlapping under-
standing, sanctions, and competition 
being present at least to some signif-
icant degree (Christiano, 2012: 45–
46).
So, in contrast to the reliabilist con-
cept of externalism in which decisions 
are epistemically and democratically 
justified as long as there are reliable 
democratic mechanisms that produce 
truth-sensitive decisions, I would like to 
stress a certain need for more participa-
tion or for better epistemic and demo-
cratic access of citizens and policy mak-
ers to decisions. More precisely, while 
the responsibility of a reliability demo-
crat would be to insure a reliable demo-
cratic procedure, the internalist ap-
proach, in whose favor I am arguing, 
























and policy-makers to understand why it 
is rational to rely on expertise and relia-
ble democratic procedures and why it is 
rational to trust to these very proce-
dures. Even if citizens and policy-mak-
ers cannot have full understanding or 
possess the total body of evidence to ap-
praise the whole content of the experts’ 
stances, their reliance or trust would be 
epistemically justified as long as they 
have enough evidence about the reliabil-
ity of the procedures through which ex-
perts make their decisions. For instance, 
that could consist of evidence about the 
experts’ moral and epistemic characters 
(or the reputation of the institutions), 
evidence about the contextual (conver-
sational) circumstances that prevent de-
ception, lying and incompetence or sup-
port trustworthiness, or even proof of 
the presence of Christiano’s truth sensi-
tive mechanisms such as solidarity, over-
lapping understanding, competition and 
sanctions. More precisely, the democrat-
ic division of epistemic labor needs to 
embrace more epistemic agency on the 
side of citizens: they should have an ac-
tive role in assessing which particular 
experts deserve trust and whether relia-
ble mechanisms truly preserve the ex-
perts’ trustworthiness.
It is true that the final epistemic 
quality of a decision depends on the ex-
pertise and the reliability of procedures 
and not on the fact that citizens or poli-
cy-makers possess the evidence. Howev-
er, in the internalist approach it is as-
sumed that an epistemic justification of 
deliberative democracy embraces not 
only epistemically qualitative decisions, 
but is also concerned with the virtue of 
the epistemic autonomy of citizens and 
their active epistemic participation/re-
sponsibility in the acceptance of these 
decisions (Zagebski, 2012). According to 
this approach, for instance, experts’ epis-
temic distinctiveness would not be de-
scribed in terms of a fundamental au-
thority that implies deference or trust 
without understanding, but only as a 
derivative authority. In contrast to a fun-
damental authority, there is nothing un-
democratic and epistemically unjustified 
in derivative authority because citizens 
trust experts on the basis of the con-
scientious stance that it is more rational 
to trust experts than themselves. Moreo-
ver, the derivative authority of experts 
differs from the derivative authority of 
non-experts only in a degree that insures 
the democratic egalitarian rationale. It 
seems that such an additional require-
ment for internal access can make 
Christiano’s reliability democracy, in a 
relevant sense, more resistant to the ob-
jections against epistemic authoritarian-
ism and anti-egalitarianism, or even 
more resistant to the objections against 
reliability epistocracy.
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Podjela epistemičkog rada u demokraciji
SAŽETAK Thomas Christiano tvrdi da jedan od temeljnih izazovi s kojima se demokracija 
susreće je primjerena podjela epistemičkog rada između građana i stručnjaka. U ovome 
članku pokušavam prikazati i analizirati Christianovo rješenje iz perspektive društvene 
epistemologije, koristeći se konceptima koji proizlaze iz tog pristupa. Iako se u najvećoj 
mjeri slažem s Christianovom pozicijom, nudim neka dodatna rješenja koja bi mogla obo-
gatiti tu poziciju s dodatnom epistemičkom i političkom odgovornošću. U prvome dijelu, 
ukratko elaboriram važnost društvene epistemologije u raspravama o epistemičkom 
opravdanju deliberativne demokracije. U drugom dijelu, kontekstualiziram Christianovu 
poziciju u svijetlu rasprava oko društvene epistemologije i identificiram njegov pristup 
kao demokraciju pouzdanosti s obzirom na njegovo uvjerenje da su procesi odlučivanja 
koji se temelje na istinitosti osigurani upotrebnom ispravnih mehanizama (koji omoguća-
vaju stručnjacima da dođu do epistemički najboljih odluka). U trećem dijelu razvijam ar-
gumente koji pružaju dodatnu podršku Christianovim rješenjima koji za cilj imaju osigu-
rati veću razinu epistemičke i demokratske kvalitete u donošenju odluka.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI  deliberativna demokracija, podjela epistemičkog rada, demokracija po-
uzdanosti, epistokracija, temeljni i derivativni epistemički autoritet
